Use and Maintenance of Hot Bearing Wayside Detectors
Accordingly, FRA recommends that railroads take the following actions:
1. Review existing HBD system inspection and maintenance policies and
procedures for compliance with existing industry standards and manufacturer
recommendations for HBDs.
2. Review existing procedures to train and qualify personnel responsible for
installing, inspecting, and maintaining HBDs to ensure they have the appropriate
knowledge and skills. Railroads should also develop and implement appropriate training
on the inspection and maintenance requirements for HBDs and provide that training at
appropriate intervals to ensure the required knowledge and skill of inspection and
maintenance personnel. Further, railroads should evaluate their training content and
training frequency to ensure any employee who may be called upon to evaluate a suspect
bearing has the necessary training, experience, and qualifications. FRA also encourages
railroads to ensure these individuals are available at all hours of operations across a
railroad’s network.
3. Review current HBD detector thresholds in light of recent derailments,
and all other relevant available data (including data from any close calls or near misses),
to determine the adequacy of the railroad’s current thresholds. Thresholds should be
established for single measurement as well as multiple measurements of individual
bearings to enable temperature trend analysis.
4. Review current procedures governing actions responding to HBD alerts to
ensure required actions are commensurate with the risk of the operation involved. With
regard to trains transporting any quantity of hazardous materials, FRA recommends
railroads adopt the procedures outlined in AAR’s OT-55 for key trains as an initial
measure.
5. Rigorously evaluate the resiliency and accuracy of the overall process
used to monitor and act upon information from wayside detectors, with specific focus on
steps and tasks that, if not performed or performed incorrectly, could mislead decision
makers. The process of monitoring, reporting, inspecting, analyzing, and acting on
information from detectors includes tasks that, if incorrectly executed, could introduce
risk. Railroads should also evaluate each step and task performed by railroad personnel
to pinpoint any HBD reporting failures and implement appropriate safeguards to
minimize the impact of those failures when monitoring, analyzing, and responding to
detector information.
Conclusion
In general, as noted in Safety Advisory 2023-01 as originally published, the
issues identified in this Safety Advisory and this supplementary notice are indicators of
a railroad’s safety culture. Implementing procedures that ensure safety, and training
personnel so those procedures become second nature, is vital. Equally important is the
commitment, throughout the organization, to safety and empowerment of personnel to
live up to that commitment. Specifically, personnel should be encouraged and
empowered to develop, implement, and comply with procedures that may temporarily
impact operations, but maximize safety, just as those executing the procedures should be empowered to strictly adhere to those procedures, even if it delays a train. The
railroads should evaluate their safety culture not only as it relates to the issues indicated
in this Safety Advisory, but to all aspects of their operations.